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A long-standing concern in political economy is whether outcomes are efficient in political
equilibrium. Recent contributions have examined the efficiency/inefficiency of policy choices
from a theoretical point of view. The aim of this paper is to examine such issue empirically.
Building on existing “economic” diagnoses that highlight the deficient incentives present in
Argentina’s Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement the paper will attempt to understand the politics
behind its adoption and persistence. We suggest an explanation based on the transaction costs
of Argentina’s political market. Although potentially Pareto-improving policies could could
have been adopted, they were not introduced because of the uncertainty over the future status
of today’s bargains, and given the lack of institutions to enforce bargains among the political
actors. The paper concludes offering some preliminary ideas for institutional engineering: what
governance structures could help reduce these transaction costs? The purpose is to create an
institutional framework in which political actors could negotiate among themselves, ensuring
the enforceability of agreements, in order to achieve more efficient outcomes.
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Introduction
Argentina is a federal republic consisting of 23 provinces and an
autonomous district, Buenos Aires City. Still, the main agent responsible for
the collection of most taxes at the provincial level is the federal government.
Most taxes are collected nationally and then allocated between the federal
government and across the provinces. This transfer scheme is generically
referred to as “Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos” (federal tax-sharing
agreement). The first such regime dates from 1934, and throughout the years
it has been repeatedly altered. As a result of these successive modifications,
the tax sharing system has evolved into an intricate scheme. According to
many observers, its current configuration does not correspond with any
economic criteria, and provides all sorts of perverse incentives (a salient
one being the incentive of provincial political leaders to overexploit the
common pool of national taxation.)
The question we want to address in this paper is why did the political
actors make a collection of choices that eventually produced a system that
can be judged as inefficient from an economic point of view. This inquiry is
naturally related to a long-standing concern in political economy: the
efficiency or inefficiency of income redistribution.  Recent studies have
revitalized such debate, focusing on the ability of the political process to
produce Pareto-efficient outcomes. This literature has promoted many healthy
discussions about the inefficiency of policies and institutions, as well as
some interesting arguments for a transaction-cost theory of politics.1
1 A good introduction to the discussion about the efficiency of redistribution is given in
Robinson (1998). The pioneer application of the “transaction-cost” logic to study the policy-
making process is North (1990b). It is worth noting, though, that “transaction costs” do not
provide a single analytical framework, but only a loose conceptual background for organizing
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Our aim, thus, is to contribute to those debates by analyzing the history
of federal fiscal relations in Argentina. The argument developed in this paper
is that time consistency problems, asymmetric information and other special
forms of transaction costs impeded Argentina’s political leaders to move
towards more efficient outcomes.
We believe that the evolution of Argentina’s federal fiscal arrangements
offers a natural ground for this kind of study, because fiscal issues are at the
heart of the State (one of the main actors in any political-economy analysis);2
and because sub-national governments provide natural actors for a political
transaction-cost analysis.3 Not only are some of the key actors easy to identify,
but also the welfare effects of budget allocations are somewhat easier to
recognize and measure than those of, say, regulatory policy or trade policy.
This paper is a first step in a research agenda where we will attempt to
identify the relevant political transaction costs that led to this inefficient
social outcome. Our main tasks will be to “unbundle” the blanket category
of “transaction costs” into empirically verifiable elements.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I offers a brief review of
the recent literature on redistributive politics and economic inefficiency.
Section II, provides a picture and critique of Argentina’s current Federal
Tax-Sharing regime. Section III contains an interpretative sketch of the
evolution of tax-sharing agreements in Argentina. Section IV suggests some
principles that help to unbundle the “transaction-cost” argument into
categories relevant for the Argentine case. Finally, section V provides some
preliminary suggestions for institutional reforms that could generate
governance structures conducive to reduce the incidence of transaction costs.
2 Some of the most important work in modern political economy has tended to move swiftly
from general theoretical discussion to fiscal applications.  Inman (1987) provides an excellent
survey and overview of this “general-fiscal” political economy literature.
3 This is a good point to announce that, even though a large part of our discussion will take
“provinces” as actors, we believe that many of the relevant transaction costs in this matter
relate to principal-agent problems between citizens and government officials.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 172
I. Relation to the Literature.
There is no clear consensus in the political economy literature on the
ability of the political process to produce Pareto-efficient economic outcomes.
That is, to allocate resources in such a way that all gains from trade are
exhausted and that no one can be better off without someone else being
worse off.  As Dixit notes, this would be the case if the workings of the
political process conform to the ideal benchmark of the Coase theorem (1960),
so that no policy that can benefit some group of people without hurting others
goes unconsummated and no Pareto improvement goes unrealized (Dixit
1996: 38-39).
Some economists (for example, Wittman 1989 and 1995)4 argue that the
redistributions we observe in the real world — while reflecting underlying
distributions of power —, are (constrained) Pareto efficient.
Still, recent studies have made an opposing argument, claiming that the
political process might fail to implement policies that could make all
individuals better off given the available instruments of redistribution (Coate
and Morris 1995, Dixit and Londregan 1995, Dixit 1996). According to these
authors, redistributions to special interests (for example, the support to
declining industries) are especially harder to interpret within an “efficiency”
view of politics.  The traditional explanation of why declining industries are
inefficiently protected is based on Olson’s logic of collective action (1965)
and (1982): small groups with large individual stakes could organize and
obtain benefits at the expense of a large number of disorganized actors with
small individual stakes. Still, as Dixit (1996) contends, a closer look at this
argument indicates that the underlying theoretical reasons for inefficient
policies must lie in considerations such as asymmetric information, time
4 Initially we included Becker (1983) as another example. We thank Professor Gary Becker
for pointing us out that what his paper really claims is that taxes, not necessarily subsidies,
tend to be efficient.  In Becker and Mulligan (1996), they argue that it may be in the interest
of taxpayers to promote inefficient subsidies to discourage political action by subsidy
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consistency problems and other special forms of transaction costs (otherwise,
again, a Coasian result should obtain).
The sub-field of information economics has emphasized the importance
of informational limitations on the workings of the economy in the past three
decades. As Stiglitz notes, market equilibria with imperfect or incomplete
information are generally not constrained-Pareto-efficient (1997: 29).
Similarly, in many cases economic inefficiency caused by redistributive
politics is also rooted in informational problems. This view has traditionally
been associated with the “Virginia school” of political economy: given that
citizens are poorly informed about the effects of different policies, politicians
can select inefficient and “sneaky” methods of redistribution over more
transparent and efficient ones in order to provide benefits to special interests.
Yet, this argument can be criticized by pointing out that in such case,
enterprising politicians would have an incentive to inform the voters and
offer the beneficial policies in order to gain their support (Wittman 1989;
Dixit and Londregan 1995). Coate and Morris (1995) present a more
compelling argument. They contend that inefficient methods of redistribution
may be employed when voters have imperfect information about both the
effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians. The example they
present is the following: suppose there is a public project that is beneficial to
a special interest but also, under certain conditions might enhance the welfare
of citizens. A problem arises because when citizens see the realization of the
project they cannot tell whether the politician is acting in their interest or
simply making transfers to the special interest. Their model suggests that if
politicians are all identical and known to be so, the transfers to special interests
will be made efficiently. Yet, if politicians differ from each other (in terms
of, say, honesty) and their types are not perfectly observable to citizens, then
transfers to the special interest might be made inefficiently.
This literature also suggests explanations to the phenomenon of
economically inefficient redistributions based on the dynamic inconsistency
of the political process. Dixit and Londregan (1995), for example, developedJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 174
a model where the anticipation of future political success makes workers
stay in declining industries. They argue that even if there is an efficient
solution to the problem of a declining industry from an economic point of
view (compensate the workers for the capitalized value of their losses in a
lump sum, and then leave them to find and take up their best alternative
opportunities), the political process will fail to implement such policy.
Politicians are not going to offer such capital sums up front because the
recipients cannot credibly promise their political support over the period
that spans the duration of their prospective income loss, so compensations
will take the form of a gradual stream of payments. The problem is that under
this transfer scheme, the workers will have to make the decision on whether
to relocate or not, knowing that once they have moved, elected officials may
renege on their promises and discontinue the flow of future installments.
Consequently, in anticipation of this, the workers’ moving decision will dilute
and, thus, the declining industry will be partially or totally locked in.
Therefore, the fact that in a representative democracy elected officials
cannot make binding agreements about future policy is another reason why
politicians might not always choose the most efficient method of redistributing
incomes.
Moe (1990) made a related point. He contended that political property
rights are especially insecure in democratic regimes, because programs that
are put in place by one generation of politicians are subsequently subject to
reversal when incumbents are voted out of office. According to him, thus,
inefficiencies are intentionally created in the public sector as a means by
which to achieve program persistence and/or to obtain political support for
programs that would otherwise be defeated.
Similarly, Besley and Coate (1998) have pointed how the problem of
time consistency may lead political actors to overlook economically efficient
policies. According to them, political turnover may hinder the implementation
of potentially Pareto-improving public investments for three reasons: i)
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not be delivered; ii) because such projects may change the identities of future
decision-makers; iii) because such projects may change the policy choices
of future decision-makers.
What all of these accounts have in common, thus, is that they explain the
adoption of inefficient policies (or the failure to implement Pareto-improving
ones) as a result of the inability of citizens and policy-makers to reach binding
agreements about future policy.  As Besley and Coate point out, the
undertakings of such bargains might seem utopian given the transaction costs
involved (1998: 153). Generally, the exchanges involved are made over time,
are difficult to specify in advance, involve different people at different times,
and need to accommodate a shifting distribution of resources. Thus, it is
tremendously difficult to carry out their enforcement (Weingast and Marshall,
1988; North, 1990b).5
In the rest of this paper we describe the Argentine federal fiscal system
and the political dynamics behind it, attempting to identify the relevant
political transaction costs; i.e., utilizing the “transaction cost politics”
approach suggested by North (1990b) and Dixit (1996).
II. Argentina’s Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement
Argentina is the most decentralized country in Latin America in terms of
public spending, with approximately 50% of its total occurring at the sub-
5 On top of the problems associated with the time dimension of political transactions
emphasized in the text, “transaction-cost politics” also stresses the cognitive difficulties
involved in the policy-making process. In order to reach the alleged “Coasian” bargains,
policy-makers should also be able to know the connection between the policies they adopt
and the effects they desire. Still, political actors do not choose policy outcomes, but rather
policies whose effects on outcomes are, usually, uncertain and realized over time (Cukierman
and Tommasi 1998a and 1998b).  As North (1990b) suggests, those who participate in
politics frequently use erroneous models of the world to guide their actions, and the
information feedback they receive is usually not sufficient to cause them to revise their
initially incorrect theories (1990b: 356). Moreover, ideologies (a “hodge-podge of beliefs,
myths, sound theories and dogmas”) underlie the subjective models these actors’ posses to
explain the world around them.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 176
national level (Interamerican Development Bank, 1997).6  At the same time,
Argentina has a high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance. From 1985 to 1995,
an average of 65% of provincial expenditures were financed through transfers
from a common pool of nationally collected taxes, with only 35% financed
from direct own-provincial revenues. The importance of the transfer
mechanisms as determinants of provincial fiscal behavior is obvious. As
Figure 1 shows, there is a high variation around this 35% (weighted) average.7
Ten provinces finance less than 15% (and sixteen provinces less than 20%)
of their spending with their own resources.
The Argentine Constitution establishes that the federal government will
employ tariffs on foreign trade to finance its expenditures, while provinces
will finance themselves through taxes on production and the consumption
of specific goods.  Over time, however, for economic and political reasons,
the national government became the main agent responsible for the collection
of most taxes at the provincial level.  The process by which these taxes, once
collected, are then re-allocated to the provinces has been the source of
numerous conflicts and modifications.  Argentina’s first national tax-sharing
agreement (“Ley de Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos) dates from 1935.8
Periodically new tax laws have been written to regulate this distribution.
The current law dates from 1988. It established that the federal government
would retain 42% of these taxes while 57% were to be distributed among
the provinces, with the remaining 1% set aside “to finance unforeseen crises
in the provinces.”9 The law also establishes the percentages of the secondary
6 If we exclude the pension system, provincial plus municipal spending in 1997 was twice as
large as spending by the federal government (Piffano, 1998).
7 The simple average is just 23%, the difference being explained by the fact that the larger
provinces (like Buenos Aires) tend to have smaller imbalances.
8 These laws define the share of specified taxes to be transferred from the central government
to the provinces (“primary distribution”) and the way in which these funds are to be allocated
among the provinces (“secondary distribution”).
9 In practice, these funds, called National Treasury Contributions (ATNs) are distributed in
a discretionary way by the National Executive, through the Ministry of the Interior (the
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distribution, and is supplemented by several other laws regulating the
distribution and destination of some specific taxes that finance a set of
predetermined activities.
Some of the main features of the 1988 tax sharing scheme prevail today,
even though there have been numerous changes and adjustments.  One of
the main changes was to establish “precoparticipaciones,” that is, to redirect
parts of the tax revenue originally destined to the tax-sharing scheme toward
other purposes. (For instance, in 1992 and 1993 the national government
was able to achieve a 15% reduction of the amount to be shared with the
provinces, in order to finance the growing social security deficits.)  Another
important change was to provide some fixed-sum transfers and a minimum
transfer guarantee to the provinces. Another factor was the decentralization
of many educational and health services since 1992.  This was to be financed
by a transfer equivalent to the estimated cost of the services transferred.
According to World Bank (1996), the tax-sharing system has reached a high
level of complexity, not corresponding with any economic criteria.  In the
next subsection we list the main “defects” that the literature has identified in
the current working of the Argentine tax-sharing agreement.
The 1994 Constitution established that a new Coparticipation Law had
to be sanctioned before the end of 1996, but that deadline was postponed
until the end of 1998, a date at which a new law has not been produced
either.  The discussions currently under way (documented in Palanza and
Sin-Silva, 1998) could be interpreted as an indication of the “transaction
cost” nature of this crucial institutional decision.
We provide below a listing of some of the main criticisms directed towards
the Argentine tax-sharing regime.
1. Lack of “Fiscal Correspondence”:  The high degree of vertical fiscal
imbalance in Argentina, coupled with the relatively large fraction of
government services provided at the sub-national level, contributes to create
a common pool problem across provinces.  This induces provincialWHY IS ARGENTINA’S FISCAL FEDERALISM SO INEFFICIENT? 179
governments to behave as if they did not face a hard budget constraint,
increasing spending and reducing local tax effort
2. The Bailout Problem: (a dynamic version of the common-pool problem).
It refers to the fact that higher levels of government are likely to bail-out
lower levels of government in financial distress, generating a moral hazard
problem that undermines the incentives of lower units to behave in fiscally
responsible ways.
3. Perverse Intertemporal Fiscal Behavior: Both Keynesian and
neoclassical macoreconomic models recommend countercyclical fiscal policy,
to help to smooth out business-cycle fluctuations. Empirical evidence for
OECD countries has found a behavior roughly consistent with these
recommendations.  Argentina, on the contrary, as most of Latin America
seems to “suffer” from procyclical fiscal policy, magnifying aggregate
economic fluctuations. Several authors have argued that this behavior in
Latin America is related to the behavior of multiple fiscal authorities in
decentralized settings.  In the case of Argentina, we have found preliminary
evidence that fiscal behavior at the provincial level is highly procyclical and
that this is, in part, caused by the tax-sharing system.10  As an illustration,
Figure 2 shows the rates of growth of GDP and of aggregate provincial
spending for the last ten years. The two are highly correlated, with provincial
spending over-responding to the fluctuations in output.  Also, the instability
10 In relation to that, many authors have argued that the tax-sharing system makes fiscal
adjustment much harder to attain. Recent evidence is provided by stabilization efforts during
the Alfonsín administration (Aizenman, 1998), and during the Convertibility plan (Schwartz
and Liuksila, 1997). In both instances, faced with the need to correct large macroeconomic
imbalances, the federal government introduced major tax, spending and administrative
reforms that succeeded in raising the ratio of taxes to GDP.  Through these efforts at the
federal level, provinces received an automatic revenue windfall via the various revenue transfer
mechanisms.  The financial problems the provinces experienced during the 1995 recession
(after the Mexican crisis) reflected difficulties in cutting back expenditures in line with
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of coparticipation funds seems to have induced fluctuations in government
consumption and a lack of predictability, which, in any sensible intertemporal
model of the economy, produces welfare losses.
4. Induced Inefficiencies in the Aggregate Fiscal Mix:  The fact that some
taxes are shared and others are not has induced the federal government to
make some inefficient decisions. As Tanzi (1996) has suggested, this leads
to situations where non-shared taxes acquire greater weight in the tax system,
even when they are less efficient.   -   Also, when fiscal adjustment is necessary,
the “optimal response” tends to include a mix of increased taxation and
spending cuts.  Given that the increase in taxes is partially dampened by
transferring 50 % of them to the provinces, this biases the federal government
towards “excessive spending cuts.” Similarly, at times this has prompted the
federal government to raise import-related revenues.11 12
5. Lack of Achievement of Fair Redistributive Outcomes: The
development of the tax-sharing regime over the years has been intimately
related to redistributive efforts. Many analysts argue that “genuine”
redistribution towards the poorer regions has been mixed with other
redistributive ventures, favoring politically powerful (needy or not) actors.
-For instance, Porto and Sanguinetti (1996) show that, even though on average
the regime has redistributed towards poorer regions, more detailed analysis
indicates that some richer provinces have benefited more than some poorer
ones and that, even among poor provinces, the redistributions do not follow
any reasonable indicator of fiscal need.- There is also the suspicion among
11 Also, there has been a tendency to implement different “precoparticipaciones” to
“compensate” for changes in taxes or national spending needs.
12 A similar problem occurs in the relation of each provinces to its municipalities.  Provinces
have to transfer a fraction of the coparticipated taxes to municipalities.  Depending on the
intra-provincial political relations, oftentimes the provincial government has incentives to
trade coparticipation funds for other monies which give “him” more discretion (we thank
Federico Weischelbaum for bringing this point to our attention).JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 182
observers and political actors that the true impact on the personal distribution
of income does not follow the regional distributive pattern. Many regimes
are thought to redistribute towards the richer citizens of the poorer provinces.
An often cited example is the “industrial promotion” (i.e. tax breaks for
businesses in some poor provinces) regime. Another suspect is the “national
housing fund” (FONAVI) which does not reach the very poor and has evolved
into a mechanism for subsidizing middle-class housing (Schwartz and
Liuksila 1997).
6. Irregular Provision of Public Goods: Part of the proceeds of several
specific taxes are earmarked to finance several specific services.  In practice,
the provision of those services fluctuates along with those taxes, instead of
following “demand side” needs.
7. Distorting Taxes: Some of the taxes that amount to a large fraction of
provinces’ own revenues are highly distorting and harmful for
competitiveness  (gross-income tax; “stamp” tax).
8. Poor Tax Compliance: Tax compliance in Argentina is very deficient.
For instance, compliance of the nationally collected VAT was estimated to
be 34% in 1989 and 55% in 1994, while neighboring countries like Chile
(80%) and Uruguay (70%) have much better compliance rates. This is not
strictly a consequence of the tax-sharing system but there are reasons to
believe that the current regime provides no incentive for provincial authorities
to collaborate in the enforcement of the collection of the most important
(shared) national taxes. This is the common pool problem again: why pay
the political cost of using local police to close down businesses that fail to
pay taxes if there is no connection whatsoever between how much is collected
and how much is received by each province out of national taxes?
9. Lack of Information and Lack of Incentives to Produce Information:
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make clear that most actors believe that there are better, more rational, ways
of designing intergovernmental transfers. In a recent meeting, there were
several statements by provincial governors complaining about the lack of
information on the way coparticipation money is spent in other provinces
(Palanza and Sin-Silva 1998).  There is a clear sense that the current regime
rewards inefficiency, through some sort of “ratchet effect,” by which
provinces that behave with austerity today, are penalized with reduced funds
next round. Hence, there is little incentive, at the level of one individual
provincial government to spend the effort and the resources necessary to
provide better information about the costs and technologies for satisfying
the different public needs in that province.
10. Misallocation of Time and Managerial Effort of the Authorities:  It is
evident that the “Federal Fiscal Game” provides incentives to political
participants to spend most of their effort and ingenuity trying to alter the
redistributive mechanism in their favor. It is commonplace in Argentina that
governors and other local officials spend more time in Buenos Aires lobbying
for redistribution, than in the province generating, implementing and
monitoring adequate public policies. (This is related to the poor information
incentives described above.)
11. Complexity: In Saiegh and Tommasi (1998) we provide a description
of the Argentine tax-sharing regime, taken from the International Monetary
Fund volume on federal fiscal arrangements (Ter-Minassian, 1997). What
the description, summarized in Figure 3, suggests is that the ever-increasing
complexity of an interdependent network of different shared taxes and of
expenditure functions and decision-making bodies renders it impossible for
voters and taxpayers to identify which government spends or taxes and for
what purposes. 13 This breaks the benefit-tax link that is essential for
13 Figure 3 is a representation of what many observers have dubbed the “Coparticipation
Labyrinth.”  Our own construction (based on Ministry of the Interior, 1996; Schwartz and
Liuksila, 1997; and Llach, 1997) may well be inaccurate at the time of writing, and will
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enhancing efficiency in the provision of public goods, at the same time that
magnifies the problem of exploitation of the common pool.
III. The building of the fiscal “labyrinth”14
Many analysts have pointed out that the extant set of federal fiscal
institutions does not correspond with any economic criteria, and provides
all the perverse incentives enumerated above. The question we want to
address, thus, is why such institutions were adopted and then persisted over
the years.
To attempt answering that question, it is useful to refer to the distinction
in Tsebelis (1990) between “efficient” and “redistributive” institutions. We
think that the explanation is that the main political actors were unable to
move to Pareto improving institutional arrangements and (not “or”) that
powerful political actors or coalitions at some points in the past were able to
instrument institutional changes favorable to them in the short run, but
deleterious to society in the long run. We believe both sets of reasons were
present in the federal fiscal history of Argentina, and that they interacted to
create the current situation.
In an environment which has been quite unstable politically (recall the
numerous military “interruptions”) and economically (inflation being its most
salient expression), political actors tended to adopt a particularly myopic
perspective, did not invest in building more efficient institutions, and
attempted to protect their (quite vulnerable) property rights.15
14  Those readers interested in a more detailed account can consult Saiegh and Tommasi
(1998) and references there.  The current summary owes a great deal to ongoing research
with Matías Iariczower.
15 As Moe suggests, the authority of decision making can be viewed as a property right (a
political property right), and the instability of these property rights has profound consequences
in the political actors choices once they are in power: policies and institutional structure are
designed to protect these property rights.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 186
Hence, many of the features of the coparticipation system derived from
this particular process of institutional change: sudden changes that improved
the bargaining power of a group of agents lead in some cases not just to
minor adjustments at the margin, but to steep radical changes (sometimes,
the alteration of the rules of the game altogether).
Rules that were put in place by civilian governments were subsequently
reversed by military regimes and vice-versa. The changes usually involved
alterations to the criteria for revenue sharing between the federal government
and the provinces as well as among the provinces. When the power was
more concentrated in the national government (mostly during military
regimes), the changes were intended to shift the distribution of shared taxes
in its favor. This was achieved by different means, such as explicitly changing
the proportion of tax revenues the national government had to share with the
provinces, or in more subtle ways, by introducing new taxes (not to be shared),
or increasing the rates of existing but unshared ones.
Conversely, with democratic opening, the once again elected provincial
governors and legislators engaged in new debates over the distribution of
tax revenues in order to reverse the changes that were produced during the
previous regime. This usually resulted in modifications to the distribution of
shared taxes in the provinces’ favor.
In our view, these attempts of political actors to protect and to appropriate
property rights in an uncertain environment account for the inefficient
evolution of policies and institutional structure.  Indeed, over time, the
successive changes eventually lead to: a) rigidity of the coparticipation
mechanism (in terms of incapacity to properly adjust to economic shocks);
b) poor incentives for healthy fiscal performance, and c) the unclear rationality
of redistribution.
For example, a typical way to appropriate more resources consisted in
the discretionary use of instruments, other than the “vertebral” tax-sharing
agreement to favor specific provincial coalitions which were politically
important at that moment in time. Another example would be not deliveringWHY IS ARGENTINA’S FISCAL FEDERALISM SO INEFFICIENT? 187
the fair compensation to each provincial government after changes in the
federal fiscal system such as the decentralization of certain services, or
changes in tax policies.
Whereas the institutional rigidities that were introduced in trying to limit
these changes included:
(1)making the tax-sharing regime (which has the nature of a veto game,
since coparticipation laws have tended to be “Leyes Convenio”)16 more
inclusive, to minimize the range of decisions relating to the federal fiscal
regime which are taken by unstable majorities in Congress or, even worst,
by discretionary bargains between the national executive and provincial
governments
(2)establishing minimum revenue guarantees for the provinces
(3)establishing floors in terms of the share of coparticipated revenues to
each province
It is worth noting that the extant law (which was sanctioned as a
temporary law in 1988) has all the appearance of being a non-discretionary
rule , which specifies exactly the pool of shared taxes and the fraction of tax
revenues going to each jurisdiction.  In fact, as the labyrinth in Figure 3
(partially!) indicates, there have been many alterations (precoparticipations,
“Pactos Fiscales”), which in turn have generated further moves attempting
to increase the “rigidity” of the system as those embedded in the 1994
Constitution.  (The very fact that several features of the tax-sharing regime
are written in the constitution is, in part, the ultimate example of institutional
rigidity).
While the institutional structure of federal fiscal relations in Argentina
16 Ley convenio is a law that requires ratification by provincial legislatures.  In practice, the
approval of these laws has been negotiated by the provincial governors with the national
executive, at the same time that in the national Congress.  It is worth noting that the
institutional set-up has also evolved from a relatively “majoritarian” decision making
procedure towards the current situation in which the 1994 requires a Ley Convenio.  This
could be interpreted as a reaction of the political actors to the uncertainty induced by instability.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 188
initially developed to protect property rights introducing more veto power,
the existence of loopholes in the original agreements17 and the possibility of
altering payoffs with substitutes to coparticipation funds which can be decided
with “lighter” majorities18 gave place to the opportunism of different
coalitions which violated previous agreements (the coparticipation laws) and
in this way introduced instability to property rights.
This has three basic effects.  First, it modifies directly the vertical and
horizontal allocation of funds, driving it away from “technical” considerations
(equity, efficiency, explicitation of stable criteria).  Second, it destroys
possible commitment technologies for the national government, leading to
dynamic inconsistencies, which relate to the common-pool (bad timing) and
bail-out problems previously described.   Finally, it affects the “structural”
decisions, inducing the imposition of rigid limits to prevent this
opportunism.19
Two recent anecdotes serve to illustrate the “transaction cost” nature of
the problem, in the sense that extant political transaction costs impede moves
towards more rational economic policies and institutional arrangements:
1. In 1998 the National Executive attempted to introduce a tax reform to
lower the (non-shared) inefficient labor taxes at a time of high unemployment,
and to raise shared taxes.20 To compensate, it requested some amount to be
17 Reflected in practices like pre-coparticipations, altering the mix of taxes, creation of new
taxes, the inflation tax, debt, etc.
18 (ATNs, national spending in the provinces, special funds, other laws favoring specific
regional constituencies, etc)
19 These limits are both “implicit” and “explicit”.  The implicit ones relate to the absent
qualities of the regime in terms of the flexibility, efficiency and insurance that could be
expected from an efficient contract.  The explicit ones are the list provided above, with its
ultimate manifestation in the 1994 Constitution.  All of these rigidities, in turn, increase the
payoff from breaking the rules.  These highlights the fact that, on top of the usual costs of
rigidities identified in the “Rules vs discretion” debate, we identify here the fact that rigid
rules are more likely to be violated.
20 After substantial negotiations and modifications the law has been passed, although there
are still several attempts at changing and partially reversing it.WHY IS ARGENTINA’S FISCAL FEDERALISM SO INEFFICIENT? 189
pre-coparticipated to the national government. The provinces resisted this
complementary clause (in part because of disagreements about the estimates
of the revenue potential of the increase in the rates of shared taxes that it
would produce).  This reflects the incapacity to come up with more complete
contracts, contingent on the actual produce of the tax changes, at the same
time that highlights the type of rigidities we are emphasizing.
2. All fiscal experts agree on the need to decentralize some taxes from
the national government to the provinces.21 The timid attempts at
implementing such decentralization faced fierce opposition from most
provincial governments — the opposite situation from what happened in
Australia (Painter 1998). This attitude (perfectly understandable in light of
prior experiences) reflects the inexistence of adequate mechanisms to
calculate compensations and enforce these deals.  Every actor fears that, in
passing to a new system with uncertain payoffs, part of current “property
rights” might be lost — and there is also an element of “hold-up” in each
province refusing to approve a beneficial social change in the hope of
receiving an extra payment for its vote.
IV. A Transaction-Cost Politics Approach to Study the
Development of the Argentine Tax-Sharing Agreement
The ideas presented in the previous section had the purpose of suggesting
the existence of high transaction costs in political markets that oftentimes
prevent the achievement of efficient solutions.
An important assumption of our reasoning is that instead of
“coparticipation” being a pure redistribution game, some transactions among
political actors may potentially have generated benefits for all concerned.
The evidence presented in section II on the current system’s inefficiencies
buttresses this supposition.
21 There is more disagreement about the details of such decentralization.  Some details are
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As we argued in section I, from a transaction-cost theory of politics, the
argument would be that the political actors tended to overlook policies and
institutions that could have been Pareto-preferred to the existing
arrangements.22
The purpose of this section is to attempt to identify the relevant political
transaction costs that beset exchanges between political actors in the
particular context of the Argentine coparticipation system. We attempt to
“unbundle” the blanket category of  “transaction costs” into some salient
components.23
1. The Frequency of Political Interactions.
Political bargains are usually difficult to sustain. The problem is that the
enforcement of political agreements depends on trust in their execution. Thus,
when it is difficult to enforce agreements, political actors do not find it
worthwhile to cooperate.
On the other hand, as “folk theorems” in game theory suggest, under
repeated interaction certain norms of reciprocity allow trust and cooperation
to develop. Thus, if an institution can secure political agreements by reducing
uncertainty and transaction costs, it will make it possible to capture the gains
from exchange. The case of a legislature such as the United States Senate is
usually seen in the literature as an illustration of this (Weingast and Marshall,
1988; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Krehbiel, 1991).
Yet, there is a problem that limits the workability of this solution: turnover.
In the case of the US Congress, as Axelrod notes, “the chance of two members
22 This is particularly the case when we incorporate the citizens as primary political actors to
the analysis (see subsection 7 below).
23 The (formidable) task of developing a definite set of categories or typical elements that a
transaction cost analysis should have is extremely ambitious, and is beyond the scope of this
paper.  This section is in part an application of the logic and style of reasoning of transaction
cost analysis to some of the most relevant aspects of the story summarized in the previous
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having a continuing interaction has increased dramatically as the biennial
turnover rates have fallen from about 40 percent in the first forty years of the
republic to about 20 percent or less in recent years” (1984: 16).  The case of
Argentina is radically different: due to the recurrent political instability, the
turnover rate of political actors was extraordinary high. For instance, for
executive positions at the national level, in the 55 years between 1928 and
1983, Argentina had 26 Presidents and 60 economic ministers. That is a
change in President every 2 years and in economic authorities every 11
months.
Moreover, given the succession of military regimes, Congress — the
natural arena for political bargains to be carried on — was closed during
extended periods of time (40% of the time between 1928 and 1983).
Even in democratic periods, turnover rates have been extremely high.
For example, the number of legislators that arrived to Congress for the fist
time was 55% (Chamber of Deputies) and 40% (Senate) in 1934 and 1935
respectively, whereas in 1983, 93% of the deputies and 82% of the senators
were “rookies” (Panosyan and Goretti, 1986). Today, after 15 years of
sustained democratic regime, the turnover rate is still very high: 77 percent
of the members of the chamber of deputies serve only one term (Jones 1996;
Saiegh 1997).
2. Uncertainty and Influence: The Coparticipation Scheme as an
Incomplete Contract.
In the presence of a complex and dynamic environment, an agreement
that calls for the future collection/distribution of the fiscal revenues, such as
Argentina’s tax-sharing scheme, must be incomplete. That is, for an
institutional arrangement of this type it would be impossible (or too costly)
to specify in advance and in detail what actions the parties would have to
take in all possible future contingencies.
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because perfectly specified and freely enforceable agreements could not be
written, the process of negotiation never really ended and power relations at
any moment in time mattered exceedingly.  Uncertainty played a major role
in structuring the different coparticipation bargains throughout the years.
These negotiations were made on an ad-hoc basis, without a consistent
political arena for the negotiations (sometimes they took place inside and
sometimes outside Congress), and without a stable legal framework.
This led political leaders to make efforts to increase the probability of
reshaping the rules of the game in their favor instead of producing managerial
innovations in the provision of public goods. In doing so, they spent valuable
resources attempting to influence the decisions on coparticipation.24  Lack
of information and hidden information were resources that political leaders
frequently used to influence decisions to their benefit and allowed them to
enjoy rents.
In this context, the different jurisdictions’ political resources played
decisive roles in establishing the size and characteristics of the coparticipation
scheme and particularly in determining its redistributive features. When the
distributions deviated from those mandated by objective criteria and
depended on the distribution of political power, the (most active) participants
of the coparticipation game started to enjoy “surplus” or rents. Thus,
differences in political power among the provinces, such as the political
overrepresentation of the smaller ones in Congress, can help to explain the
existence of some “funny” redistributive components of the coparticipation
scheme (Porto, 1990; Porto and Sanguinetti, 1996; and Piffano, 1998).
24 Thus, the behavioral patterns developed in this context were efficient at making the
coparticipation scheme as a whole even more inefficient. We do not wish to blame or tag as
irrational every political leader with this argument. On the contrary, their maximizing activity
resulted from learning by doing and investing in the kind of skills and knowledge that paid
off.  A government official told the authors, that for a provincial leader it paid off much
more to know the exact timetable of the flights to Buenos Aires – in order to extract resources
from the national government— than either to know the details of tax administration in the
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3. The “Argentine Federal Fiscal Game”
Several authors have provided game-theoretic formalizations of the
common-pool problem in decentralized macroeconomic settings; for instance
Aizenman (1993 and 1998), Aizenman and Isard (1993), Mondino,
Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1996), Tabellini (1986).  These papers present
non-cooperative games in which independent authorities choose spending
levels as in a Cournot-Nash game, and aggregate outcomes such as excessive
spending, large deficits or inflationary finance (depending on the economic
model) obtain.  In all of these cases, the emphasis is on non-cooperative
outcomes, as cooperation through repeated interaction is not obtained.  We
know that when the conditions for cooperation through repeated play are
not met, there is still hope of attaining better outcomes than those of the
non-cooperative Nash, through institutional design and/or self-imposed
constraints. One way of achieving that would be to endow one player (say,
the national government) with commitment capabilities— for instance, not
to finance (ex-post) expenditures above a pre-specified limit.
Sanguinetti (1994) presents an interesting model, motivated by the
Argentine experience, which captures some of these features. There are a
number of local governments and a central government engaged in deciding
their respective spending levels, to be financed out of national taxation.  He
analyzes three regimes: cooperative, non-cooperative and “commitment.”
In the latter, the national government is a Stackelberg leader who sets the tax
rate before the simultaneous spending choices of all players. This regime
leads to welfare outcomes superior to the non-cooperative case (although
inferior to the cooperative one).25
We could interpret the history of fiscal federalism in Argentina as moving
25 Sanguinetti and Tommasi (1998) extend that framework and consider the role of
idiosyncratic economic shocks to the provinces.  They show that, under asymmetric
information, welfare comparisons present several trade-offs among different institutional
setups.  For instance, a “lax” fiscal regime may offer some advantages in terms of its risk-
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back and forth along the line between the commitment regime and the non-
cooperative one. For instance, we interpret the hardening of the national
budget constraint through the Convertibility Law in 1991 (which forbade
the Central Bank from printing money) as a step towards the commitment
regime.  Complementary steps were the privatization of several provincial
banks. Further commitment could be achieved through some mechanisms
that would require extraordinary majorities in order to approve assistance to
provincial governments that run into financial crises.
The “game” we are describing is further complicated by the fact that the
player “Nation” is not just a “benevolent central planner” but also a self-
interested opportunistic actor.
4. Lack of Credible Commitment by the Federal Government (or The
“Schizophrenic” Role of the National Congress)
As it is well known, the history of (fiscal federalism in) Argentina is
plagued by mutual mistrust between “the center” and “the provinces.” In the
last few decades, one of the central axes of that conflict was the battle between
the Federal government and the provincial governments over the distribution
of fiscal obligations and resources.
It is clear that in the “game” across provinces, the national government is
a potentially efficient institution onto which they can delegate powers as a
way of solving some of their collective action problems. But at the same
time, being an actor with its own interests, it faces serious credibility
problems.26 Indeed, the history has many instances in which this power has
been abused.27
26 The main reason is that there is an agency problem: the actors that embody the “National”
interest (President, congressmen, bureaucrats, national party organizations, etc.) are not
perfect agents of the people. Citizens actually live in one of the 24 sub-national jurisdictions
(the story was slightly different before the “provincialization” of all federal territories). This
is also an instance of a common-agency problem, as mentioned in subsection 7.
27 On top of that “Bayesian” reason there is a Nation-Province “mental model” that hinders
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The potential federal abuse of discretionary authority is a political
equivalent of the hold-up problem in transaction-cost economics.  Given the
federal government agencies’ inability to commit to a future course of action,
potentially valuable transactions between provincial and national leaders
may never take place. This is magnified by the fact that oftentimes, the federal
government can “move” faster than the provinces due to their collective
action problems.
This “conflict” has been mediated and or exacerbated by several
institutions.  One such institution is the National Congress (when it has been
in operation), and its interactions with the national executive and with
provincial governments.
5. The Entangling of Efficiency and Distribution
To return to one of the themes mentioned in the introduction, we believe
that the story we are trying to understand can be conceptualized, to some
extent, as a story of inefficient redistribution.  The world is a very complex
environment and the political actors will, in general, not be fully informed
about the exact distribution of possible effects that a particular measure or
arrangement will have on their welfare.  When we combine this with all the
conflicts of interests and commitment problems just described, it makes clear
that there is ample room for the strategic manipulation of information: both
about “facts” and about “mappings.”
The story of “Coparticipación”, as well as the broader history of economic
policy in Argentina, is full of instances in which superficially plausible (but
erroneous) arguments were made to justify particular redistributive policies
and mechanisms.28
28 One example have been the numerous “industrial promotion” schemes, tax exemptions
for particular industrial ventures in particular regions, which were peddled as instruments
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6. Mental Models and Ideology
There have been several crucial turning points and several unrealized
trades in the history summarized in Saiegh and Tommasi (1998), which can
only be understood by reference to the “mental models” that the actors had
at the time. The notion of “mental models”  (internal representations that
individual cognitive systems create to interpret the environment) is exposited
in North (1990b) and Denzau and North (1994).29
One example is the perennial preoccupation with the uneven geographical
distribution of population, wealth and economic activity.  This is one of the
“ideas” one would need to trace down from its justifiable origins, to the
excesses and mistaken policies later committed in its name.30
7.  Principal-Agent Problems
We believe that the Argentine federal fiscal relations provide a nice
playground for a transaction-cost politics approach because the different
political jurisdictions constitute “natural” players.  This led us to put (perhaps
too) much emphasis on the “games” across political units, as if they were
unified political actors in which politicians act as perfect agents for their
constituencies.  However, that is certainly not the case; we believe that
“agency problems” are pervasive in the political history of Argentina.
Precisely those agency problems, coupled with imperfect voter information,
are at the crux of the transaction costs we emphasize.
In particular, political situations like the ones we have been describing
29 Professor North suggested that we further investigate the evolution of some mental models
behind the history of fiscal federalism in Argentina, a task that we hope to accomplish in
future work.  Shumway (1991) provides a good account of some of the “guiding fictions” in
Argentine history.
30 It is worth mentioning that “the achievement of an equivalent level of development
throughout the national territory” was enshrined in the 1994 Constitution as one of the
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belong to the class of “common agency” problems (Bernheim and Whinston
1986, Dixit 1996).  One general conclusion of models with multiple principals
is that the power of incentives are very much weakened (an excellent
application to the control of politicians by citizens through electoral
mechanisms, which reaches a similar conclusion is Ferejohn 1986).
8.   The Inflation Link
It is no discovery that the economic and political history of Argentina
has been marked by inflation. The extremely high and unstable inflation
history of Argentina in this century has had important bearings on the
distribution of total tax revenues (inclusive of inflation tax) across
jurisdictions, especially between the nation and the provinces.  At the same
time, inflation has been, to some extent, an outcome of the federal fiscal
game we are analyzing.  It operated sometimes as ex-post “closure” of the
system, softening the aggregate budget constraint, and sometimes as a
strategic weapon in the hands of the national government.31
One of the features to explore in the future is the strategic delay in the
transferring of the collected taxes to the provinces, which in periods of high
inflation might have substantially changed the real primary distribution.  This
might have been behind the provinces’ preoccupation with institutionalizing
the “automatic mechanism” of payments (now in place).32
A related feature of inflationary processes, of particular importance
for a transaction-cost story, is that inflation complicates all type of nominal
31 A telling episode occurred during the discussions in 1987 of what is the current Ley de
Coparticipación.  The Alfonsín government was cornered economically by the pressure of
the International Monetary Fund, and politically by the peronist opposition. Hence, it utilized
the threat of inflating the economy as a last resort in order not to concede even further in the
negotiations around coparticipation, tax reform, and labor laws (Saiegh and Tommasi, 1998).
32 This emphasis might have distracted from more rational discussion about the
“fundamentals” that should guide the tax sharing agreement.  For some thoughts on market
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calculations, increasing the cost of transacting.  (See for instance Joskow
1974 for a transaction-cost approach to the effects of inflation on regulation).33
It remains for future research to explore the multiple links between the
(federal) fiscal history and the monetary history of the country.  We conjecture,
that through this transaction-cost politics analysis one might be able to identify
some structural characteristics of the Argentine case that lead to such an
unusual inflation history, a task that, in spite of its obvious importance, has
not been adequately resolved.
9. “Pre-coparticipaciones”
One of the salient dimensions of Nation-provinces conflict in recent times
has been the use by the central government of the idea of “pre-
coparticipaciones”; that is, amounts which are subtracted from the pool of
coparticipation funds, for some particular use (oftentimes related to spending
responsibilities of the federal government).
This “trick” clearly represents an instance of “ex-post” renegotiation with
respect to previous agreements. Its use has intensified after 1988, which is
further proof of the current system’s inadequacy.
10.Provinces - Municipalities
Most of the economic arguments about the virtues of decentralization
seem to apply better to smaller units such as municipalities or localities than
to units of the size of the typical Argentine province.
On the other hand, there are possibly some “politico-economic” arguments
that may call for a “provincial” structuring of countries; perhaps along the
lines of Weingast (1995) and (1997); see also Inman and Rubinfeld (1997).
33 In this area it is hard to establish causality, but the date of approval of the national budget
is positively correlated with inflation (i.e., the budget was approved later in years of higher
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It is obvious that the evolution of “federations” such as Argentina does
not necessarily respond to any sort of “optimal design”, but it is in large part
history-dependent.34  It would be worthwhile to explore these issues in our
transaction-cost framework.
11. The mixing of long and short-term considerations in the negotiations
Several of the episodes described in Saiegh and Tommasi (1998) — for
instance the discussion of the 1973 Law, and the Constitutional Convention
of 1994 — reflect the fact that, short-term (circumstantial) considerations
impinged upon the institutional outcomes. We hypothesize that some
characteristics of the Argentine political environment sometimes induced
political leaders to act in (socially) myopic ways.
This could possibly be a general characteristic of “the politics of
institutional choice”, relating to the differing horizons of many actors, which
deserves special analysis in the transaction-cost view of politics.35
V. Conclusions:
Some preliminary thoughts on institutional engineering
We have argued in this paper that the argentine political actors made a
collection of choices that produced a tax-sharing system that, in the view of
all experts is clearly inefficient.
We also claimed that since the political bargains around the coparticipation
scheme were made over time, were difficult to specify in advance, and
34 A particular aspect of this in Argentina relates to the fact that the “country” was originally
“designed” as if the central economic activity would be the mineral exploitation of present-
day Peru.  That factor tended to generate a politico-bureaucratic structure in the northwestern
provinces, which turned out to be dysfunctional in light of the subsequent economic evolution.
(See for instance Sawers 1996 and Cortés Conde, 1974)
35  A “Coasian principle” would call for separation of short-term from long term considerations
(in the spirit of “constitutional political economy”; see Brennan and Buchanan, 1985 and
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involved different people at different times, political actors could not make
credible commitments and thus, potentially valuable transactions between
them never took place. Thus, the issues of information and of intertemporal
enforcement played a key role in precluding them from moving towards more
efficient outcomes.
We believe that these inefficiencies are remediable (at least, in part).36
We are attempting to propose a governance structure that will try to minimize
the incidence of the main transaction costs described. Some work in progress
along those lines is summarized in Iaryczower, Saiegh and Tommasi (1998).
In this section we present a brief sketch of some of the suggestions for the
establishment of a set of institutional arrangements that would allow the
main actors to bargain with each other and reach a more efficient allocation
of fiscal resources.
Such a proposal involves a trade-off between rules (i.e. a stable framework
that would make it possible to avoid costly ruptures and discontinuities) and
flexibility (i.e. an institutional arrangement that would allow for the
introduction of improvements, and that would have the capacity to adjust to
changed circumstances).
Given Argentina’s past experience, the new institutional framework
should be lasting so as to create a propitious atmosphere for the involved
actors to make decisions in a foreseeable setting, allowing them to concentrate
in managerial efforts instead of involving into continuous bids for the
distribution of resources. On the other hand, it would also be commendable
if this enduring legal framework had the necessary flexibility to adapt itself
to (a) changes in the economic and social structure of the country, and also
in the public policies chosen by the elected politicians; and (b) scientific,
technical and informational advances, that would allow an improvement in
the provision of the public services.
Therefore, the “governance structure” we have in mind is one that at the
same time would allow the Argentine political actors to deal with on-going
problems as they arise and yet provide a degree of durability to the whole
36 This stands in contrast with the general theoretical view of Oliver Williamson (1996).WHY IS ARGENTINA’S FISCAL FEDERALISM SO INEFFICIENT? 201
coparticipation scheme. At this point it is worth reflecting on the convenience
of introducing flexibility in this way or in another form, for example with a
legal framework with a predetermined duration, that should be replaced in turn
by another institutional arrangement. The Argentine historical experience
indicates that the latter could lead to a series of partial solutions (often
incoherent with each other), incessant conflicts, and actually, to the very same
labyrinth we are trying to leave behind. From a social choice perspective, such
institutional “flexibility” can lead to very volatile outcomes because the size
of the set of points that can defeat the status quo is usually quite large.
As a result of the political bargains that were held during the constitutional
reform process, the new Constitution calls, in its article 75, for the creation
of a federal fiscal institution (FFI) to oversight and control the execution of
the coparticipation regime in the future. Although the constitutional mandate
is rather vague with respect to this institution, we believe that it should secure
political agreements by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs.
From our point of view, thus, the role of this governance structure, should
be twofold: On the one hand, to reduce the chance that viable policies are
overlooked, either because they are not considered or because information
on their viability is misleading. On the other hand, its role should be to ensure
that the enforcement of political agreements would be executed.
To fulfill these two goals at the same time, the proposed institution should
have very strong technical capacities (to generate good information) and
should be able to make decisions that are political in nature. A possible way
to achieve that could be to conform the FFI with a Technical Committee
(TC) composed by experts in fiscal matters and a Federal Fiscal Assembly
(FFA) integrated by the political representatives of each jurisdiction (for
instance, the ministers of economy of the provinces and of the Nation).37
37 The “governance structure” suggested is similar to the institutional setting in place in
Australia. (Australia, like Argentina, is characterized by a relatively large vertical fiscal
imbalance.) The “TC” we are referring to is in some respects analogous to the Australian
Commonwealth Grants Commission, which reports to a Premier Conference (analogous to
our suggested “FFA”). See Craig (1997) for a description of the Australian federal fiscal
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This way, whereas the TC makes policy recommendations, the
implementation of these policies would be finally decided by the FFA. On
the other hand, the FFA should not be able to make decisions if these are not
based on the TC’s analysis.38
With regard to the FFA decision making process, whether to support or
reject the TC’s policy recommendations, different voting rules (unanimity,
special majorities, simple majority rule) and different voting procedures (open
rule, germane rule, close rule) could be used to decide on different issues
regarding the coparticipation regime. For example, the FFA could be able to
introduce changes in the coparticipation scheme following a proposal made
by the TC by a simple majority vote, while any change that had not been
proposed by the TC should be done by a unanimous decision. Or — stated
in the positive political theory jargon — the TC could be the “agenda setter”
and then the FFA will take a vote on such proposals under a closed rule
procedure. That is, the Assembly would approve or reject each proposal,
and thus, in the case of a rejection, the status quo would remain.
Our research is still preliminary. Further work is needed in order to
establish who should be the “first mover” in each one of these situations,
and to study in more depth the “game” that would unfold after the players
make their respective proposals. Ideally, and after conducting an in-depth
analysis, we would like to provide some recommendations with respect to
voting rules and procedures in the FFA, the most desirable sequence of moves,
etc.
In any case, the main idea that is guiding these preliminary thoughts on
institutional engineering is that under a federal fiscal institution with these
38 Given that the TC will produce the information from which the FFA members should base
their decisions, the design of the TC must seriously consider such aspects as the selection
and removal of its members, its financing, etc. The objectives of the federal fiscal institution
could be weakened completely if — as it has often happened in Argentina — the technical
body is not conformed by people who are: (a) able to develop such a complex task; (b)
absolutely independent of the interests involved (in this case the different jurisdictions); and
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characteristics, political actors would delegate the technical aspects to a
technical committee (taking advantage of its expertise and conserving on
scarce resources of time, staff and energy), and at the same time there will be
an institutionalized context for political bargaining over fiscal matters.
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